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Realist scholars have long debated the question of how much power states need to feel secure. Offensive realists claim that states should constantly seek to increase their power. Defensive realists argue that accumulating too much power can be self-defeating. Proponents of hegemonic stability theory contend that the accumulation of capabilities in one state can exert a stabilizing effect on the system. The three schools describe different points along the power continuum. When a state is weak, accumulating power increases its security. This is approximately the situation described by offensive realists. A state that continues to accumulate capabilities will eventually trigger a balancing reaction that puts its security at risk. This scenario accords with defensive realist assumptions. Finally, when the state becomes too powerful to balance, its opponents bandwagon with it, and the state's security begins to increase again. This is the situation described by hegemonic stability theory. These three stages delineate a modified parabolic relationship between power and security. As a state moves along the power continuum, its security increases up to a point, then decreases, and finally increases again. This modified parabolic relationship allows scholars to synthesize previous realist theories into a single framework.

This research undertakes to provide a typology of multipolar systems. Multipolarity plays a key role in IR theory, for it is strictly associated with the history of European politics since the seventeenth century to the end of World War Two. Despite wide investigation, one can doubt the matter has received a definitive treatment. Trouble is that current studies often consider multipolarity as a one-dimensional concept. They obviously reckon that multipolarism is substantially different from other systems and deserves attention, but generally fail to distinguish between different types of multipolar systems (the few exceptions are listed in chapter one). The history of international politics tells us a different story. Multipolar power systems may share some general characteristics, but they also show a wide array of difference, and understanding this difference requires a preliminary work of classification. That is the purpose of the present study. The work is organized as follows. In chapter one, we provide a cursory review of the literature on multipolarity, with particular reference to the work of Duncan Snidal and Joseph Grieco. Then we propose a four-cell typology of multipolar systems to be tested via historical analysis. The first type, hegemony, is best represented by European international system to the time of Napoleonic France, and is discussed in chapter two. Type number two is the traditional concert of Europe, which history is detailed in chapter three. Type number three is the reversal of alliances, which closest example, the diplomatic revolution of 1756, is discussed in chapter four. Finally, chapter five is devoted to the chain-gang system, and the European politics from Bismarck's late years to World War One represents a good illustration of how it works. In chapter six we proceed to draw a first evaluation of the main results achieved in the previous chapters, in order to see if, and to what extent, our typology serves the purpose of explaining the nature of multipolar systems.

- This paper reports an analysis of the Revolution in Military Affairs, a central topic of the strategic debate since the end of the Cold War. Three main points are discussed. The first one is the historical root of the Revolution. In particular, it is emphasized that the crisis of legitimacy of the US army after the Vietnam War has had a positive, triggering effect over the process of modernization. The second section is dedicated to the analysis of the central concepts and meanings associated with the Revolution: information warfare, global positioning systems, the "system of the systems" and so on. The third issue discussed is the future of the US grand strategy. Here the authors try to shed some light on the strategic dilemmas American decision makers shall deal with over the next few decades and conclude that the durability of the American primacy relies on four main factors: the state of the American economy, the timing of confrontation with its rivals, the spread of new technologies, and the development of the terrorist threat to American security.